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GRUTTER OR OTHERWISE: RACIAL 
PREFERENCES AND HIGHER EDUCATION 
Larry Alexander* 
Maimon Schwarzschild** 
The Supreme Court decisions on affirmative action have ar-
rived.1 They are dubious as constitutional law, bringing to mind 
what John Hart Ely said of Roe v. Wade: "it is not constitutional 
law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be. "2 Yet 
because the cases were about whether affirmative action is per-
missible, not whether it is required, the salient question- now 
more than ever-is whether preferential affirmative action is a 
good thing. At least in higher education, we will suggest, there is 
overwhelming reason to think it is not. 
The outcome of the Supreme Court cases should perhaps 
have been no surprise. The set-up was perfect for Justice 
O'Connor, who has made something of a career of being the 
Court's swing voter, and who has a penchant for opinions that 
split unsplittable babies.3 The University of Michigan's two ra-
cial preference admissions schemes- the undergraduate school's 
crude "20 points if you're a minority,d and the law school's al-
legedly holistic "how does each person contribute to an educa-
* 
** 
1. 
(2003). 
Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 53\1 U.S. 244 (2003); Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 53\1 U.S. 306 
2. John Hart Ely, The IV ages of Crying \Vo/f A Commem on Roc v. Wade, /l2 
YALE L.J. \120,\147 (1\173). 
3. See, e.g., Mitchdl v. Hdms, 530 U.S. 7\13, /l36 (20m) (O'Connor, J, concurring 
in an '"establishment clause" case involving public aid to private-including parochial-
schools, hut refusing either to endorse the "neutrality" test favored by the plurality or the 
"no aid to any religious mission" principle of the dissent); Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1 \1\12) (O'Connor, J, joining two other Justices in 
striking down "undue burdens" on abortion fur reasons of s/llre decisis while repudiating 
the "trimester scheme" and other key clements of Roc v. Wade); Wygant v. Jackson 
Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267,284 (1\186) (O'Connor, J., cnncurring in striking down 
a minority preference in teacher layoffs. but refusing either to juin the plurality's rejec-
tion of racial preferences or the dissenters' endorsement of them). 
4. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244. 
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tionally-enriching diverse student body?"5 -were perfect for 
O'Connor's rejection of transparent racial goals and endorse-
ment of disingenuous ones.6 As is fairly widely recognized, the 
law school's scheme is dishonest because it is not what it is billed 
to be, namely, a holistic, individual assessment of applicants, 
conducted with an eye to the quality of the educational envi-
ronment: rather, it is like the undergraduate system, a plan that 
is about meeting goals for racial representation. Educational 
benefits are doubtful and, in fact, largely window dressing driven 
by language in Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke7• As for the 
"holistic" individual assessments, they always seem to produce 
something very close to a particular percentage of particular mi-
norities. Nor is there ever any question of ensuring "critical 
masses" of, say, farm children, Appalachians, evangelical Chris-
tians, or ex-businessmen/businesswomen, all of whom might con-
tribute to legal education as much as or more than people identi-
fied by their race. Justice O'Connor presumably knows all this, 
although she pretended not to. 
The finding that Michigan's interest in maintaining an elite 
law school is a compelling interest sufficient to justify a racial 
classification is utterly inconsistent with the Court's suspect-
classification/compelling-interest jurisprudence now extending 
back over many decades. Are the "means" -racial preferences-
really "necessary" to ensure that the law school will be of elite 
quality? In California there are several public law schools, gen-
erally conceded to be among the most elite in the country, which 
are forbidden by the state constitution to indulge in racial pref-
erences. As for "diversity" as a "compelling interest," imagine a 
state government's plan to "diversify" some heavily minority 
branch of state government by giving preferences to whites. 
Does anyone believe Justice O'Connor would uphold those? 8 
5. Gruuer, 53LJ U.S. at 306. 
6. Justice O'Connor joined in Chid Justice R..:hnquist's majority opinion in Grmz 
holding unconstitutional the undergraduate school's 20 point preference fur minorities, 
and she authored the majority opinion in Gruuer upholding the law school's ''holistic," 
race-as-a-factor admission scheme. 
7. Regents uf the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1LJ78). 
8. Suppose that racial preferences were necessary for ensuring that the University 
of Michigan's law school remained "elite." Is maintaining an elite law school a compd-
ling governmental interest, as strict scrutiny demands'1 Would it justify, say, the intern-
ment of Japanese-Americans, as in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1LJ44), if 
somehow racial internments were necessary for producing elite law schools? Or perhaps 
more realistically, would it justify forcibly conscripting, say, Jews or Asians, if members 
of these groups failed to apply to Michigan's law school in sufficient numbers to maintain 
its elit<.: status 'I or course not. Q.E.D. 
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The compelling interest test for racial classifications is dead- at 
least in this case. 
What Justice O'Connor's opinion amounts to is that if uni-
versities can disguise their admissions systems so that it is not 
too blindingly obvious that they are pursuing racial representa-
tion for its own sake, they can get away with it, although they are 
admonished that using race as a criterion is a dirty business and 
that they should try their hardest to eliminate it by, say, 2028. If 
''strict scrutiny" of racial classifications has to be diluted or dena-
tured in order to uphold the plan, then so be it, although the 
Court will claim not to be doing so. And after all, perhaps diver-
sity is a compelling interest. Look at all the amicus briefs from 
corporate America saying that it is. 9 
Whether or not the Supreme Court should have held racial 
preferences by the government to be unconstitutional, what 
seems clear to us is that the culture of racial preferences in 
higher education has proved very bad as a matter of policy. And 
the policy question is now what counts, because the Grutter deci-
sion does not require colleges and universities to engage in racial 
preference in admissions (much less in faculty hiring or promo-
tion): the decision merely permits admissions preferences. So the 
question is thrown back to the universities, or to the state legisla-
tures, to decide as a matter of policy. 
For better or worse, racial preferences in higher education 
have been a fact of life for several decades in the United States. 
More is therefore known from experience, or ought to be, than 
could have been known when preference policies were intro-
9. Why do corporations file brids in support of racial prd!.!n:nc!.!s'l First, it sounds 
good, at kast in thus!.! in!lu!.!ntial circks wiKrl! "a!!irmativl! action" is a mattl!r of poli-
tico-moral sdf-congratulatlon if not an article of faith. These briefs arc like the tckvision 
commncials that would have you b!.!licvc the oil company cares about th<: environment. 
When corporations cndors.: racial preferences to produce "diversity," thl!y arc similarly 
trying to sound progressive so that people will s.:.: them in a warmn, softer light and buy 
their products. 
Second, howevn, managers of a corporation might endorse allirmativc action (or 
any oth<:r political cause) cv.:n if ll is not good for the corporation, to advance their pn-
sonal views or agl!ndas: an exampk of "agency costs." 
Third, corporations fear pr<:ssure from "activists." If a corporation is threatened, ex-
plicitly or implicitly, with boycott (or worse), the corporation may conclude that it costs 
less to submit rathn than to incur the boycott. 
Finally, large corporations may obtain a competitive ccunomic advantage if legal 
rules impose expensive or counterproductive programs equally on them and on their 
smaller, poorn compl!litors, who can less afford to comply. 
What all this suggests to us is that the endorsement of racial affirmative action by 
corporate America should carry littk or no weight. 
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duced-perhaps with the best of intentions-years or decades 
ago. 
1. Racial preferences at public universities require government 
officials to classify people by race; but racial (and ethnic) 
classifications are unscientific, arbitrary, and often nearly 
meaningless. 
Human beings are not divided biologically into three, or 
five, or any number of "races." Human beings are one inter-
breeding species. Each individual is genetically unique. No mat-
ter into which racial box one is arbitrarily put, one can have chil-
dren with someone from another box, and the children must 
then be arbitrarily assigned to some box. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, people spoke about the "French race" and the "German 
race." That might seem silly today, but it is no sillier than speak-
ing of the "white race," or bracketing (or separating) Somalis 
and Zulus, or Melanesians and Polynesians, or Mongols and Ma-
lays. If an ex-slave from Jamaica married the daughter of an 
English planter, and their son married the daughter of a Trini-
dadian Indian and a Chinese merchant, what box would the 
University of Michigan have their daughter check, and why? If 
that question cannot be nonarbitrarily answered-and it can-
not-it is not because the example is farfetched. It is not. Every-
one fits this example. Everyone is genetically unique, and all of 
us are members of one interbreeding species. Any division into 
"races" is arbitrary; 10 and, when done by government, it tends to 
be obnoxious. 
And if race is arbitrary, so too is "ethnicity." Who, for ex-
ample, is a Hispanic? A poor Indian from Oaxaca? A writer of 
German ancestry from Santiago? An emigrant from Barcelona? 
A Jewish academic from Buenos Aires? 
In everyday life, to be sure, when we refer to someone's 
race or ethnicity, we need not be speaking scientifically, and it 
may do no harm to be arbitrary. People classify themselves and 
each other in all sorts of ways. Sometimes these classifications 
hurt, but sometimes they are not of much consequence. In any 
event, there are as many classifications as there are classifiers, 
and classifications morph and change over time. But when the 
10. There is hroad scholarly support for this proposition. See, e.g., NAOMI ZACK, 
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND RACE 58-62 (2002); JOSEPH L. GRAVES, JR., THE 
EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RACE AT THE MILLENICM 
(2()()1); Joshua M. Glasgow, On the New Biology of Race, 100 J. PHIL. 456 (2003). 
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government classifies people racially and ethnically, and then 
makes valuable entitlements such as admission to a university 
turn on those classifications, matters are different. Because race 
and ethnicity are scientifically baseless and arbitrary, govern-
ment will necessarily classify-and bestow favor and disfavor-
arbitrarily. The precedents for such classification are not en-
couraging: the Jim Crow South, apartheid South Africa, Balkan 
states at various points during the twentieth century, and- with 
lots of pseudo-science to back it up-Nazi Germany. Not re-
gimes most Americans would wish to take as models. 
2. Racial classifications by government lead to racialism, and 
racialism leads to division and often to racism. 
When government classifies by race in order to award pref-
erences, that very fact encourages people to think that "races" 
are real categories, not bogus ones, and that one's race is an ex-
ceedingly important rather than a superficial fact about oneself 
and others. In other words, it encourages people to pay close at-
tention to race and to think in racial terms. That is what is meant 
by "racialism." 
Racialism in itself might seem relatively harmless. After all, 
racialism- thinking that race is real and important- is not the 
same thing as racism, which is thinking that some people deserve 
less concern and respect than others solely because of their race. 
Yet racialism has a built-in tendency to promote racism. 
For one thing, racialism's message is that the races are dif-
ferent from one another. If races were the same, there would be 
no point in distinguishing them. But if the races are different, 
then however much we might like to "celebrate difference," we 
are apt in fact to have racial antagonism. If what is important 
about me-what you "celebrate"-is not my common humanity 
with you, but my difference from you (because of my race or 
ethnicity), I shall see myself as different, and I shall be disposed 
to nurture and accentuate my differences. This is quite common 
on campuses: students admitted because of their "difference" 
tend to magnify their difference and often segregate themselves 
from others. Once differences are magnified, antagonisms tend 
to magnify as well. This is all too common in human experience. 
People would not have to be exhorted to "celebrate difference" 
if they did so naturally and un-self-consciously. 
Above all, so far as colleges and universities are concerned-
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3. Racial preferences in higher education are bad for 
students and for the institutions themselves. 
The overall costs of racial (and ethnic) preferences greatly 
outweigh the occasional benefits. 
There are surely individual success stories that are the re-
sults of racial preference: young people who, but for such prefer-
ence, would not have attended an elite university, yet having 
been admitted, go on to achieve success in school and beyond. 
University admission processes are imperfect, and racial prefer-
ences sometimes correct what would have been an erroneous 
decision. Of course, anecdotes about such successes do not take 
into account the success stories that might have been told had 
those excluded- because their race was not preferred- been 
admitted instead. 
The heavy educational and social costs are several: 
(a) Diluting admissions standards. 
The typical criteria for admission to selective colleges and 
universities-GPA and SAT (and their postgraduate equivalents 
such as the LSAT, MCAT, and GRE)-although imperfect as 
measures of aptitude for higher education, are nonetheless 
pretty good, especially when compared to proposed substitutes 
like race, or thinly-veiled proxies for race, such as "life experi-
ence."11 In efforts to disprove the merits of GPA and SAT, some 
defenders of preferences point to individual minority students 
who do as well in college as some non-minority students, but 
who were admitted with lower GPAs and/or SATs. But, of 
course, these findings do not prove that the GPA/SA T is a poor 
predictor, for minorities or for anyone else. A GPA/SAT index 
predicts how the median student with that index will perform, 
not how every student with that index will perform. Students in 
the right-hand tail of the bell curve of people with a lower index 
will overlap with people in the left-hand tail of the bell curve of 
people with a higher index. If you compare only those people in 
the area of overlap, you will draw the erroneous conclusion that 
the indexes don't predict well. But that is to ignore the median 
person with the index, not to mention those in the right tail of 
II. See, e.g., Diane Ainsworth, Reg ems Approve Comprehensive Review Admissions 
Process, BERKELEYAN ONLINE, 29 Nov. 2lXll, http://www.bcrkclcy.edu/ncws/lx:rkckyan/ 
2lXll/11129_compr.html. Cf Matt Cox, Preference Versus Preparation: UC Regents Rewm To 
Race-Based AdmissiollS, Pacilic Research Institute Briding, Apr. 2lXJ2, available at http://www. 
pacilicrcscarch.org/pub/sab/cduca!IPrcf_ v _prep. pdf. 
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the higher index bell curve and the left tail of the lower index 
bell curve. 
The fact is that those admitted to college or graduate school 
through racial preferences are in general less qualified- not nec-
essarily unqualified (whatever that means), but less qualified-to 
do college and postgraduate work than those admitted without 
preferences. 
(b) Lowering of educational standards at schools that admit 
by preferences. 
If students admitted through racial preferences are less 
qualified- and, in general, they are- this will have consequences 
for the quality of education that they and others on campus will 
receive. Predictably, having a body of racially and ethnicly iden-
tifiable students who are at a competitive disadvantage with the 
other students leads to grade inflation to disguise the poor per-
formance of a racially identifiable group. No one wants such a 
readily visible group of students to fail or to do poorly. Likewise, 
it leads to the creation of bogus departments and majors, similar 
to-but generally more extensive than-the "athletes' courses" 
and majors designed to keep athletes above water at universities 
with admissions preferences for athletes. Virtually every univer-
sity with serious racial preferences has one or more departments 
that are safe houses for the less qualified racially preferred: de-
partments that are frequently staffed by faculty who are them-
selves hired on the basis of racial preferences; departments that 
substitute political polemics and esteem-raising for rigorous, dis-
interested scholarship. 12 
One of the worst outgrowths of racial preferences is that 
students admitted through such preferences are systematically 
mismatched educationally. 13 A student who would have been an 
A orB student majoring in a serious discipline at State Univer-
sity turns into a C or D student majoring in ethnic studies at 
Elite University. A generation of minority students, who would 
have done well, or certainly no worse than average, at colleges 
where they would have been admitted on their merits, have in-
stead been "cas. aded" upwards to colleges where their prepara-
tion and qualifications are significantly below average, and 
where- entirely predictably- many do significantly less well 
than average, and in subjects that are more polemical and less 
12. See THO\tAS SOWELL. AFFIR\1ATIYE ACriO:\ AROL:\D THE WORLD 14H (2004 ). 
13. See id. al 145-50. 
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rigorous than average; and all too many fail. Upon emerging 
from college, minority graduates-especially those from the 
more prestigious schools-are liable to be stigmatized as af-
firmative action graduates, their capabilities and their skills mis-
trusted. Perhaps the most poisonous aspect of this is the linger-
ing self-consciousness it provokes: "Do my colleagues on the job 
secretly look at my ethnicity or the color of my skin and assume 
that I am not up to the job?" 
Meantime, on campus, the presence of less qualified and ra-
cially-identifiable students and faculty, coupled with the official 
line that "difference" is celebrated, inevitably encourages a more 
general erosion of real academic standards. No one wants to be-
lieve that he or she is less qualified than his or her peers, 
whether one is a student or a professor. Perhaps one is just "dif-
ferently qualified." Indeed, perhaps the prevailing academic 
standards, those by which relative quality is gauged, are them-
selves just figments of European, or male, or capitalist values, no 
more (and perhaps less) valid than other standards. Perhaps 
there are just "different" standards for good literature, math, 
history, economics, and science, and no standard is superior to 
the others. 
This heady blend of identity politics and postmodern nihil-
ism has already had destructive effects on many disciplines on 
many campuses. Much of this is a direct outgrowth of racial and 
other identity preferences in admissions and in faculty hiring and 
promotion. 
(c) Racial balkanization and segregation. 
The combination of emphasizing racial differences and at-
tacking standards for admissions and hiring tends to balkanize 
campuses. If races are different, and if standards are i1legitimate, 
why not accentuate the differences through racially separate 
dorms, organizations, and cliques, as well as academic depart-
ments, and why not at the same time demand the admission of 
still more students and the hiring of more faculty based on race? 
After all, the differences are real and important. And no legiti-
mate standards are compromised by expanded racial admissions 
and hiring. Preferential admission based on race, far from satis-
fying anyone, leads to escalating racial demands and racial sepa-
ration, and-perversely or otherwise-to an increasing sense of 
grievance among many "beneficiaries" of preferences. 
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Sadly, the racial segregation one finds on campuses today is 
not solely attributable to beliefs in "difference." It is also attrib-
utable to a fear that the once-conventional academic standards, 
far from being illegitimate, are in fact valid measures of aca-
demic wherewithal. Better to congregate with others admitted 
preferentially, whether in choosing an academic major or in 
choosing with whom to eat at the lunch table, rather than to mix 
freely with those whose stronger qualifications might expose one 
to humiliation. 
(d) Pervasive dishonesty. 
The currency of academic life is, or ought to be, candor. 
When intellectual honesty vanishes from research, publication, 
and teaching, the purpose of the academy is compromised or 
lost. 14 Yet preferential admissions and hiring lead directly to 
"political correctness" and its assault on academic candor. There 
is a constant fear that frank discussion of racial preferences and 
the standards they compromise will wound the pride of those ra-
cially preferred. Enter an array of campus speech codes and 
conventions-the informal ones are far more pervasive than the 
formal ones-as protection against any possible outbreak of 
candor. 
4. Universities are not interested in race for reasons of 
educational "diversity." 
We can be brief about this. In recent years, universities have 
sought to justify racial preferences by the alleged contribution of 
racial diversity to the education of those admitted under the 
normal standards. Those arguments are insincere: the universi-
ties are interested in race, not diversity of views or backgrounds. 
No universities give preferences in admission or in faculty hiring 
to evangelical Christians, to children of military families, or to 
many groups that are quite underrepresented in student bodies 
and particularly on faculties. (How many faculties have sought 
out a "critical mass" of conservative Republicans to ensure di-
versity?) Much of the rhetoric about "diversity" stems from the 
fact that the idea appeared in the-lone-opinion of Justice 
Lewis Powell in the Supreme Court's Bakke decision in 1978, 
and was seized upon, more or less opportunistically, by those 
who were already convinced that the cause of civil rights (or 
14. See id. at 190-93. 
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their particular conception of it) calls for racial and ethnic pref-
erences. 
5. What Is to Be Done About Racial Disparities in 
Qualifications for Selective Universities? 
Whenever any child fails to achieve his or her full educa-
tional potential, that is a loss no matter what the child's race. For 
minority children the loss may be particularly sharp, insofar as 
minority families may have fewer non-educational resources, on 
average, with which to help their children establish themselves in 
life. No doubt many minority children fail to reach their educa-
tion potential, and this is reflected in the disproportionately 
small percentage of blacks, in particular, who can gain admission 
to selective universities without the aid of racial preferences. 
And there are no doubt many white and Asian students who fail 
to realize their potential, even if the percentage is not as high as 
that of blacks. But every case of such failure is a personal and 
community loss, no matter the race of the child. 
Why are some minorities proportionately less qualified to 
attend selective universities? Poverty and poor schools are 
among the obvious suspects, although cultural attitudes matter 
as well. Distressingly, the black-white gap in SAT scores occurs 
even in middle class suburbs, where whites and blacks are socio-
economically similar, and poverty is often an effect, as much as it 
is a cause, of poor educational preparation. 15 
We have argued that the government does much harm, and 
little good, by maintaining racial and ethnic preferences, espe-
cially in higher education. Do we offer any different, or better, 
suggestions for what the government should do? 
The main thing the government should offer is strong and 
effective public schools, primary and secondary; and public col-
leges and universities that have academic integrity. Racial pref-
erences systematically erode the integrity of higher education, in 
various ways which we have tried to indicate. The erosion of 
higher education also has an ugly way of penetrating down (it 
would "trickle down" if erosion could trickle) to the secondary 
and even to the primary school levels. Grade inflation, lowered 
("dumbed down") standards, bogus courses, racial and ethnic 
cheerleading, intellectual nihilism, and cant about diversity are 
15. See, e.g .. ]OHI" U. 0GBU, BLACK AMERICAN STUDENTS IN AN AFFLUENT 
SLBL1RB A STUDY OF ACADE~!C DISENGAGEMENT (2003). 
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now common in high and middle schools, and even in grade 
schools. They undermine the quality of public education, which 
particularly disserves the children of poorer families- and hence 
many children of minority families-who truly depend on the 
public schools for a way up in life. A cynic might wonder 
whether upper-middle-class advocates of racial preferences are 
not promoting their own children's interests by seeking to 
weaken public education at all levels, thus strengthening their 
children's inherited advantage by weakening the potential com-
petition from poorer children, who must rely on the public 
schools for their preparation in life. 
Apart from primary and secondary education, a child's 
home life is surely the other important contributor, or non-
contributor, to preparation for higher education. For young peo-
ple to qualify for selective universities, it surely helps if they 
grow up in stable, nurturing families, where children are read to, 
where books are common household items, where homework is 
supervised, where good grades are demanded, and where de-
structive peers and behavior are put off-limits. Government pro-
grams cannot readily guarantee these conditions, but to the ex-
tent that public policy can promote the relevant values, it ought 
to do so-if the goal is that children of all races should have the 
chance to realize their real academic potential. 
Meantime, public universities and colleges should put an 
end to racial and ethnic preferences. 16 They should eliminate bo-
16. As Carl Cohen sums up the dkcts of th<.: policy of racial and ethnic prdcrences 
in higher education: 
1. prekr<.:nce divides the society in which it is award<.:d; 
2. it establishes a dreadful precedent in exwsing admiued racial discrimination 
to achieve political objectives; 
3. it corrupls the universities in which it is practic<.:d, sacrificing intellectual 
values and creating pressures to discriminate by race in grading and gradua-
tion; 
4. it breeds hypocrisy within schools and encourages a scofllaw attitude 
among college officials; 
5. it obscures lhe real social problem of why so many minority students arc nut 
comp<.:titivc academically; 
6. it obliges a choice of some few e1hnic groups, which arc to be favor<.:d over 
all others; 
7. it compels a de/ermination of how much blood is needed to establish race 
m<.:mbcrship; 
~. it removes incen1i1·es for acad<.:mic cxcdkncc and encourages separatism 
among racial and ethnic minoritics; 
Y. it mismatches s/udems and inslillaions, greatly increasing the likelihood of 
failure for many minority stud<.:nts; 
10. it injures race relations over th<.: long haul. 
CARL COHEN & )A~ES P. STERBA, AFFIR~ATIVE ACTIO~ A"D RACIAL PREFEREI'CE 
lOY (2003). 
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gus academic departments: those that substitute racial or ethnic 
or political sloganeering for any serious pursuit of knowledge. 
Most important, they should hold students (and faculty mem-
bers) of whatever race or ethnicity to the same high standards, 
rather than cultivating lower standards and lower expectations 
for particular groups of people. 
Ethnic and racial warfare have a~ain and again proved poi-
sonous to societies around the world. 7 The best hope for a de-
cent future is to seek and to promote people's common human-
ity rather than their superficial differences. That was the 
"progressive" point of view at the inception of the modern civil 
rights movement, and it still should be. American higher educa-
tion ought to put the emphasis there, and not on the bankrupt 
educational politics of racial and ethnic division. 
17. See SOWELL. supra note 12, at 177-90. 
